Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service
February 8, 2021
in the United States
Ben Goldman
The federal government has been involved in preserving and improving passenger rail service
Analyst in Transportation
since 1970, when the bankruptcies of several major railroads threatened the continuance of
Policy
passenger trains. Congress responded by creating Amtrak—officially, the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation—to preserve a basic level of intercity passenger rail service, while
relieving private railroad companies of the obligation to maintain a business that had lost money
for decades. In the years since, the federal government has funded Amtrak and, in recent years,
has funded passenger-rail efforts of varying size and complexity through grants, loans, and tax subsidies. Most recently,
Congress has attempted to manage the effects on passenger rail brought about by the sudden drop in travel demand due to the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Amtrak’s ridership and revenue growth trends were suddenly upended,
and passenger rail service in many markets was either reduced or suspended.
Efforts to improve intercity passenger rail can be broadly grouped into two categories: incremental improvement of existing
services operated by Amtrak and implementation of new rail service where none currently exists. Efforts have been focused
on identifying corridors where passenger rail travel times would be competitive with driving or flying (generally less than
500 miles long) and where population density and intercity travel demand create favorable conditions for rail service.
Improving existing routes: On the busy Northeast Corridor line owned by Amtrak, several projects to modernize or extend
the life of existing infrastructure have been completed using federal grants overseen by the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA). Amtrak has also received annual appropriations above authorized levels for use on the Northeast Corridor in recent
years, but proposed projects to add capacity or reduce trip times require a level of investment that outstrips existing options
for passenger rail funding. Federal grants have enabled state-supported routes off the Northeast Corridor to add additional
trains per day and/or to reduce trip times (whether by increasing speeds or rerouting trains onto more direct alignments),
though many routes reduced or eliminated service as a result of the pandemic. Some grant funds have also preserved service
on Amtrak’s long-distance lines, which account for under 15% of ridership while incurring the largest operating subsidies,
but these too have curtailed service amid the pandemic.
State-supported and long-distance routes generally operate over tracks owned and maintained by freight railroads (called
“host” railroads), which can interfere with existing service and complicate plans to add trains to already congested freight
lines. Interference by freight trains has been cited by Amtrak as a major contributor to its trains’ poor on-time performance,
although freight railroads sometimes dispute this. A federal law passed in 2008 was designed to hold host railroads to new
performance standards, but was the subject of court challenges for nearly a decade. New standards were adopted in 2020, and
are to go into effect following a grace period during which host railroads may renegotiate schedules with Amtrak.
New rail services: Amtrak has partnered with several states to extend existing routes beyond their former termini to serve
new stations, sometimes using additional federal grant money. A high-profile project to build a truly high-speed rail system
in California was awarded nearly $4 billion out of the roughly $10 billion appropriated for intercity rail projects in 2009-
2010, but projected costs exceed earlier estimates and current funding is sufficient to build only an initial segment. The
Trump Administration sought the return of some federal grants. Meanwhile, several efforts are under way in the private
sector to bring intercity passenger rail to major urban corridors. One of these, the
Brightline service in Florida, serves Miami
and West Palm Beach on a line that is planned to eventually reach Orlando, though service was suspended in March 2020 and
Brightline does not expect it to return until late 2021. While privately funded and operated, these projects do benefit from
public assistance in other ways, as
Brightline was allowed to issue tax-subsidized qualified private activity bonds to finance
construction. Pilot programs to allow private railroads to compete for the right to serve existing Amtrak routes have been less
successful.
Rail programs were included in the most recent surface transportation authorization, which expires at the end of FY2021.
Issues in reauthorization include whether and how to fund plans to build new infrastructure for improved rail services,
especially on the federally owned Northeast Corridor; federal support for operating intercity rail services; the process by
which rail lines are planned; the obligations of freight railroads to carry passenger trains; and whether other opportunities
exist for the private sector to build or operate passenger rail services. The choice of strategies to address these issues may
depend on the time it takes for rail ridership to return to pre-pandemic levels.
Congressional Research Service
link to page 5 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 10 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 18 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 25 link to page 25 link to page 11 link to page 28 link to page 32 link to page 33 link to page 13 link to page 16 link to page 27
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Federal Role in Passenger Rail ................................................................................................. 1
Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors ..................................................................... 2
Rail Corridor Improvement Grants ........................................................................................... 3
Intercity Passenger Rail in the FAST Act .................................................................................. 4
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements Program (CRISI)................... 4
Federal-State Partnership for State of Good Repair Program ............................................. 4
Restoration and Enhancements Grant Program .................................................................. 4
Improvements to Rolling Stock................................................................................................. 5
Federal Loans for Passenger Rail Projects ................................................................................ 6
Metrics and Standards to Improve Performance ....................................................................... 6
Recent Improvements to the Existing Network ............................................................................... 8
The Northeast Corridor ............................................................................................................. 9
NEC Future ......................................................................................................................... 9
The Gateway Program ...................................................................................................... 10
The National Network .............................................................................................................. 11
State-Supported Routes ...................................................................................................... 11
Long-Distance Routes ....................................................................................................... 14
High-Speed Rail and Other New Lines ......................................................................................... 17
California High-Speed Rail ..................................................................................................... 17
All Aboard Florida/Brightline/XpressWest ............................................................................. 18
Texas Central Railway ............................................................................................................ 19
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 20
Corridor Plans Outstrip Historical Funding Availability ......................................................... 20
Rail Plans Are Not Always Coordinated ................................................................................. 20
Legal and Regulatory Hurdles to Competition ....................................................................... 21
Intercity Rail Proposals from the 116th Congress .................................................................... 21
Figures
Figure 1. Amtrak On-Time Performance by Service Line, FY2004-FY2019 ................................. 7
Figure A-1. Map of Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors ......................................... 24
Figure B-1. Map of New, Improved, and Planned Intercity Passenger Rail Lines ........................ 28
Figure C-1. Multistate Regional Rail Planning Study Networks .................................................. 29
Tables
Table 1. Status of Major HSIPR-Funded Projects on the NEC ....................................................... 9
Table 2. Selected HSIPR-Funded Improvements to State-Supported Routes ............................... 12
Table A-1. Description of Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors ............................... 23
Congressional Research Service
link to page 29 link to page 27 link to page 29 link to page 33 link to page 33
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Table B-1. New, Improved, and Planned Intercity Passenger Rail Lines ...................................... 25
Appendixes
Appendix A. Federally Designated HSR Corridors ....................................................................... 23
Appendix B. New, Improved, and Planned Intercity Passenger Rail Lines .................................. 25
Appendix C. Multistate Regional Rail Planning Study Networks ................................................ 29
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 29
Congressional Research Service
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Introduction
Intercity passenger rail in America dates to the rail industry’s origins in the 19th century. As
common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, railroad companies built hundreds of thousands
of miles of track across the country offering both freight and passenger transportation, making the
distinction between a freight railroad and a passenger railroad a relatively recent one. Federal
regulation was important in the industry’s development. The Hepburn Act of 1906 (34 Stat. 584)
authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate maximum interstate passenger
fares to ensure that they were “just and reasonable.” The Transportation Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-625,
72 Stat. 571) gave the ICC authority to allow a railroad to discontinue passenger service on a line
while continuing freight service.1
By the mid-20th century, passenger services faced increased competition from jet airliners offering
faster travel times and private automobiles offering convenient access to a network of new
federally funded highways. The rail industry’s worsening financial health meant that
infrastructure conditions also worsened as maintenance was deferred, contributing to reduced
speeds and reliability. With ridership declining, the ICC permitted railroads to discontinue many
passenger services and focus on carrying freight. In an effort to shore up flagging passenger rail
service, Congress passed the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-221),
creating an office in the Department of Commerce to foster research and development of new
transportation technologies (the Department of Transportation did not yet exist).2 This contributed
to the establishment of the nation’s fastest rail service, the Metroliner, on the Washington, DC, to
New York City portion of the Northeast Corridor (NEC), when that line was still under private
ownership.
In the years since, Congress has taken an active role in preserving and improving passenger rail
service. Although ridership is much lower than in the heyday of long-distance trains, the federal
government continues to support passenger rail through a variety of grants, loans, and tax
preferences. There continues to be debate over whether federal subsidies for passenger rail are
justified, given competing alternatives by air or highway that dominate most intercity travel
markets (though these alternatives may also receive subsidies). President Biden called for a
“second great railroad revolution” during his 2020 election campaign, using existing grant and
loan programs to improve passenger rail service.3 However, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a
sharp drop in patronage and curtailment of many Amtrak services. The corporation faces
significant challenges in restoring ridership, complicated by the possibility that pandemic-induced
changes in travel patterns will persist even after the pandemic recedes.
The Federal Role in Passenger Rail
As several freight railroads, including the Penn Central, the nation’s largest, entered bankruptcy
in 1970, Congress created Amtrak—officially, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—to
1 For background on federal regulation of passenger rail service, see archived CRS Report R42512,
Passenger Train
Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli.
2 In a global context, high-speed rail (HSR) generally refers to electric-powered trains, operating at sustained top
speeds of 150 miles per hour or more, usually on tracks designed and built for their exclusive use. In the United States,
policies and programs to improve passenger rail will sometimes use the phrase “high-speed rail” even if the resulting
rail service does not fit that description.
3 Biden-Harris Campaign, “The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an Equitable Clean
Energy Future,” https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/.
Congressional Research Service
1
link to page 27
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
preserve a basic level of intercity passenger rail service, while relieving private railroad
companies of the obligation to run passenger trains that had lost money for decades.4 Amtrak is
structured as a private company, but virtually all of its shares are held by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (U.S. DOT).
Amtrak owned no infrastructure at the time of its creation. It was originally structured as a
contracting agency, and Amtrak trains were operated by private railroads over tracks they owned.
Under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R Act) of 1976, ownership of the
NEC was transferred from the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad to Amtrak.5 At the same time,
Congress initiated the Northeast Corridor Improvement Program, which required travel times of 3
hours and 40 minutes between New York and Boston, and of 2 hours and 40 minutes between
New York and Washington, by 1981. While the act funded many improvements along the
corridor, these goals were not achieved.
The law that created Amtrak also stipulated that Amtrak pay host railroads for the incremental
costs specific to Amtrak’s usage of tracks—for instance, the additional track maintenance costs
required for passenger trains. Amtrak is not required to contribute to a freight railroad’s overhead
costs. Then, in 1973, Congress granted Amtrak “preference” over freight trains in using a rail
line, junction, or crossing (P.L. 93-146, §10(2), 87 Stat. 548), but Amtrak has been unable to
enforce this preference to ensure that host railroads operate its trains on schedule.
Several railroads continued to operate long-distance passenger services after 1970 rather than
contracting with Amtrak. The last of these services was discontinued in 1983. Amtrak itself
discontinued a number of the routes it originally operated, but has been required by Congress to
maintain a “national network” of long-distance trains. Amtrak has received federal funds to cover
operating losses and capital expenditures since its creation.
Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA, P.L. 102-240) empowered
the Secretary of Transportation to designate up to five high-speed rail corridors. These were
required to be “rail lines where railroad speeds of 90 miles per hour are occurring or can
reasonably be expected to occur in the future” (§1010). ISTEA created an annual set-aside of $5
million from a highway funding program to fund railway-highway crossing safety improvements
on these corridors. As the presence of grade crossings can restrict how fast trains can travel, this
provision funded projects that had the potential to boost maximum speeds.
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21, P.L. 105-178) increased the number
of high-speed rail corridors to 11 (s
ee Table A-1). These have a total length of roughly 9,600
miles, less than half the length of the current Amtrak network. Several of the designated
“corridors” are in fact networks of interlocking or diverging lines. For example, the Midwest
high-speed rail corridor, as initially designated, consisted of lines radiating outward from Chicago
to Milwaukee, St. Louis, and Detroit; further extensions to these lines have since been added to
the corridor designation, which now goes by the name of the Chicago Hub Network. Most
corridors were designated at the discretion of U.S. DOT, but three—the Gulf Coast, Keystone,
and Empire State corridors—were designated by statute.6 Almost all corridors are between 100
4 For additional information, see CRS Report R44973,
Amtrak: Overview, by David Randall Peterman.
5 P.L. 94-210.
6 P.L. 105-178, §1103(c)(2).
Congressional Research Service
2
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
and 500 miles in length, the distance range in which rail is expected to be competitive with other
travel modes.
Most federally designated corridors already receive some intercity passenger rail service, and
roughly half of all federally designated corridors are served by Amtrak’s NEC or state-supported
routes. Approximately 1,500 miles of federally designated high-speed rail corridors currently
receive no intercity passenger rail service of any kind. Some of these segments were regularly
served by Amtrak trains as recently as 2005; others have not seen intercity passenger rail service
since before Amtrak initiated operations in 1971. There is no longer a dedicated funding program
for this network as there had been under ISTEA, but federal designation was incorporated into
later efforts to improve passenger rail as discussed below.
Rail Corridor Improvement Grants
The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA, P.L. 110-432, Division B), enacted
in 2008, created discretionary grant programs to expand or otherwise improve passenger rail
service. Sections 301, 302, and 501 of PRIIA authorized up to $3.725 billion in grants to states to
develop intercity passenger rail service. One of these new programs, which authorized $1.5
billion specifically for high-speed rail corridor improvements, explicitly defined “corridor” as a
federally designated corridor established by ISTEA or TEA-21.
With PRIIA in effect, the 111th Congress appropriated a total of $10.6 billion to develop intercity
passenger rail services in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L.
111-5) and the FY2009 and FY2010 Department of Transportation Appropriations Acts (Div. I,
Title I, P.L. 111-8, and Div. A, Title I, P.L. 111-117), well in excess of authorized levels. That
same year, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) published its High-Speed Rail Strategic
Plan, which outlined the Obama Administration’s priorities to improve intercity passenger rail
service using the programs created by PRIIA and the infusion of funds provided by ARRA.7 This
document indicated that the federally designated high-speed rail corridors were to be prioritized
in the coming solicitations for intercity passenger rail grant funds.
FRA ultimately used this money to award 158 grants under the new High-Speed Intercity
Passenger Rail (HSIPR) Grant Program. Some 80% of the funding went to a relatively small
number of large-scale projects, each within a federally designated priority corridor. These
included multi-billion-dollar grants to California and Florida for new high-speed rail lines;
Florida subsequently turned down its grant. Most grants funded projects that made incremental
improvements to existing services, rather than the establishment of new lines (with the notable
exception of California’s high-speed rail project, discussed later in this report). HSIPR also
offered grants for passenger rail planning, which previously had not been addressed by
departments of transportation in some states. The 112th Congress rescinded $400 million of the
$10.6 billion previously appropriated and did not adopt the Obama Administration’s requests for
additional funding. No subsequent HSIPR funding has been provided.
Several states ultimately declined HSIPR grants to improve or expand intercity passenger rail
service. That funding was reallocated to other states. Some of the remaining projects encountered
delays in delivery, meaning their effects on passenger rail service have only recently begun to be
felt. Other projects are still years away from completion, and still others funded planning and
engineering work that requires additional funding for construction. Specific improvements in rail
service brought about by these grants are discussed in later sections of this report.
7 Federal Railroad Administration, “Vision for High-Speed Rail in America,” April 2009, https://railroads.dot.gov/
elibrary/high-speed-rail-strategic-plan.
Congressional Research Service
3
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Intercity Passenger Rail in the FAST Act
Authority for passenger rail programs lapsed when PRIIA expired at the end of 2013. After a gap
of two years, passenger rail programs were reauthorized by the Passenger Rail Reform and
Investment Act of 2015, enacted as Title XI of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act
(FAST Act, P.L. 114-94).
In the FAST Act, Congress did not continue the approach taken in PRIIA of authorizing large
sums for capital grants to implement or improve passenger rail service over entire corridors. The
FAST Act did, however, contain a number of measures intended to improve passenger rail in
other ways. The collective effect of these programs has been to advance some passenger rail
projects initiated under PRIIA, but on a comparatively smaller scale. Some intercity passenger
rail projects have also been advanced using funds from U.S. DOT’s TIGER/BUILD grant
program, a discretionary program that supports infrastructure investments deemed to have
significant local or regional impact.8
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements Program (CRISI)
Section 11301 of the FAST Act created this grant program, which merged eligibility from several
programs, including the Intercity Passenger Rail and Congestion Reduction programs created by
Sections 301 and 302 of PRIIA. A total of $1.433 billion was authorized for this program from
FY2016 through FY2021; to date, $1.616 billion has been appropriated by Congress. The
program has not yet resulted in any increases in speed or frequency within the intercity passenger
rail system. However, it has been used to fund implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC)
systems in many areas. PTC is primarily a crash-avoidance technology, but in certain cases it can
allow trains to travel faster.9 In FY2021, out of $375 million appropriated, not less than $75
million was to be set aside for intercity passenger rail projects.10
Federal-State Partnership for State of Good Repair Program
In Section 11302 of the FAST Act, Congress created the Federal-State Partnership for State of
Good Repair program to fund the rehabilitation or replacement of aging infrastructure used for
passenger rail service. A total of $1.297 billion was authorized for this program; to date, $1.075
billion has been appropriated. By statute, preference is given to grant applications with at least a
50% nonfederal share of project costs, to applications submitted jointly by multiple applicants,
and to projects sponsored by other entities than Amtrak alone. The Partnership program is more
explicitly directed to intercity passenger rail projects by statute, but similarly to CRISI it is
primarily designed to fund the replacement or rehabilitation of aging infrastructure rather than to
implement new or dramatically improved passenger rail service.
Restoration and Enhancements Grant Program
In Section 11303 of the FAST Act, Congress created the Restoration and Enhancements program
to cover the operating costs of reinitiating passenger rail services that have been suspended.11
This sets it apart from other grant programs administered by FRA, which generally fund capital
grants for infrastructure improvements. Many corridors are potentially eligible for these funds, as
8 For details, see https://www.transportation.gov/BUILDgrants/about.
9 See CRS Report R42637,
Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues, by John Frittelli.
10 P.L. 116-260, Division L, Title I, pp. 666-667.
11 Codified at 49 U.S.C. §24408.
Congressional Research Service
4
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
many passenger routes have been discontinued by Amtrak since its creation, but the program was
primarily aimed at restoring service along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. A section of Amtrak’s
long-distance
Sunset Limited ran between New Orleans and Orlando from 1993 until it was
suspended after sustaining damage during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
A total of $127 million was authorized for this program; to date, $37 million has been
appropriated. Several grants have been awarded, but not all of these have yet been put to use to
fund operations:
The Southern Rail Commission (a multistate coalition formed to promote
passenger rail in Southern states) was awarded two grants worth a total of $9.8
million to reinstate service between New Orleans and Mobile, but capital
improvements necessary for the service are not yet complete. A $33 million
CRISI grant was awarded to the Southern Rail Commission in 2019 to help
complete the necessary improvements, contingent upon the availability of state
matching funds.12
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation received a $12.6 million grant to
add a second daily round trip between Chicago and St. Paul, which would
supplement Amtrak’s long-distance
Empire Builder service. The necessary
capital improvements received a $31.8 million federal CRISI grant, but the
Minnesota legislature has not committed that state’s share of the required
matching funds.
The Connecticut Department of Transportation received a $4.4 million grant to
support two additional weekday trains on its CT
rail service between New Haven
and Springfield. (This is not an Amtrak service, but operates on a route also
served by Amtrak.)
Improvements to Rolling Stock
The federal government has taken several steps to improve passenger rail by supporting the
acquisition of new rail cars and locomotives. Rail equipment can have an effect on the speed and
frequency of rail service. Older equipment may not be capable of running at high speeds or be
compatible with modern train control systems or accessibility laws. Amtrak periodically
rehabilitates and expands its own fleet of rail cars and locomotives, although some states have
purchased specialized rail equipment to supplement Amtrak’s existing fleet.
Section 305 of PRIIA tasked Amtrak with creating a Next Generation Corridor Equipment Pool
Committee to design, develop specifications for, and procure standardized rail equipment for use
on state-supported short distance corridors. The committee developed specifications for diesel
locomotives and bi-level passenger cars. Five states—California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri,
and Washington—agreed to jointly procure a total of 130 passenger cars and 32 locomotives for
use on their state-supported rail corridors. They did so using a mix of state funds, federal funds
awarded for corridor improvements, and a $268 million HSIPR grant awarded specifically for
equipment procurement.
The locomotive procurement was awarded to Siemens, and Siemens-built “Charger” diesel
locomotives are now in service on several Amtrak routes, with the potential for additional follow-
up orders. The regional passenger car procurement was awarded to Sumitomo Corporation of
America, and subcontractor Nippon Sharyo was to assemble the cars at a newly expanded factory
12 John Sharp, “Amtrak returning service to the Gulf Coast,”
AL.com, June 7, 2019, https://www.al.com/news/2019/06/
amtrak-set-to-return-to-gulf-coast.html.
Congressional Research Service
5
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
in Rochelle, IL. However, a prototype car failed an important structural test, and the requisite
design changes would have delayed the project beyond certain deadlines imposed by the federal
funding agreement. Ultimately, Nippon Sharyo was replaced by Siemens, and the procurement
was modified to substitute single-level rail cars for the bi-levels originally contracted.13 The
delays resulted in a portion of the $268 million grant expiring and being returned to the Treasury.
The first Siemens railcars were delivered to California and Michigan for testing in December
2020, but have not yet entered revenue service.14
Procurement of new rail equipment can be constrained by certain federal regulations. Purchases
of rail equipment using federal funds are subject to “Buy America” requirements for domestic
content and final assembly. FRA safety standards require passenger rail cars that operate in mixed
traffic with freight trains to be able to withstand certain crush forces. This makes most passenger
rail equipment designed for use in Europe or Asia impossible to deploy in the United States
without major modifications, increasing unit production costs. The safety standards also make
passenger rail equipment heavier, which in turn makes it more difficult for trains to accelerate and
decelerate quickly, increasing trip times. Regulations promulgated by FRA in 2018 attempt to
address this, creating a category of Tier III passenger rail equipment permitted to operate at
speeds up to 220 miles per hour (mph) on dedicated tracks or up to 125 mph on lines also used by
freight trains.15 The regulation also modifies certain crashworthiness and occupant-protection
requirements on Tier I equipment (designed for speeds below 125 mph) to permit a greater
variety of train car designs to operate on the U.S. network.
Federal Loans for Passenger Rail Projects
Passenger rail projects are eligible under two federal loan programs, the Railroad Rehabilitation
and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program and the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation Act (TIFIA) program.16 Neither of these programs was designed with passenger rail
specifically in mind; RRIF was intended for use primarily by freight railroads, and TIFIA has
primarily been used for toll road and transit projects. Because loans require a revenue source to
establish creditworthiness (the ability to repay a loan), and because passenger rail lines rarely
generate an operating profit, these programs have seen limited application to intercity rail.
However, Amtrak has used RRIF loans to purchase new locomotives for the Northeast Corridor,
which does generate an operating profit. Amtrak’s two active RRIF loans, totaling over $3 billion,
now represent almost 60% of total nominal RRIF loan amounts.
Metrics and Standards to Improve Performance
Only 73% of Amtrak trains arrived at all stations on time in FY2019, the last fiscal year prior to
the pandemic, and Amtrak routes often fall short of internal on-time performance goals. Among
trains on long-distance routes, half arrived at their final destinations within 15 minutes of the
scheduled time in 2019. The freight lines used by most Amtrak services may have little incentive
13 https://www.railwaygazette.com/news/traction-rolling-stock/single-view/view/siemens-replaces-nippon-sharyo-in-
multi-state-coach-order.html.
14 Section 305 Next Generation Corridor Equipment Committee, Monthly Activities Report: December 31, 2020, p. 3,
http://www.highspeed-rail.org/Documents/305%20Activities%20Reports/2020/December/
305%20activities%20report%20-%20monthly%2012-31-20.pdf.
15 83
Federal Register 59182.
16 See CRS Report R44028,
The Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) Program, by David
Randall Peterman, and CRS Report R45516,
The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA)
Program, by William J. Mallett.
Congressional Research Service
6
link to page 11
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
to give priority to Amtrak trains at the expense of their own more profitable operations. However,
trains on the Amtrak-owned NEC also reached their final destinations late on roughly one trip out
of fiv
e. Figure 1 below illustrates the fluctuations in endpoint on-time performance for Amtrak’s
three business lines over the last 16 years. In general, reliability on state-supported routes and on
the NEC has been relatively stable compared to long-distance routes. Where state-supported
routes used to lag behind the NEC, they now tend to be more or less equal in terms of reliability,
though both have dipped from their historic highs.
Amtrak has made forceful statements blaming host railroads for poor on-time performance. In
one recent example from February 2019, a Twitter account used by Amtrak to alert riders of
service issues identified host railroad Norfolk Southern by name as the cause of a delay. In
response, Norfolk Southern issued a letter disputing the cause of the delay, accusing Amtrak of
damaging Norfolk Southern’s reputation, and threatening further action. Amtrak’s response
continued to blame Norfolk Southern, listing additional delays it attributed to the company and
suggesting that it take “immediate action to improve the on-time performance of Amtrak trains on
your railroad.”17
Figure 1. Amtrak On-Time Performance by Service Line, FY2004-FY2019
Source: Amtrak Endpoint On-Time Performance reports.
Notes: NEC includes Acela, Metroliner, and Northeast Regional trains, including those terminating/originating at
stations outside the NEC. Figures for 2004-2012 also include Keystone trains, then grouped in the “Amtrak
Corridor” category in Amtrak’s performance reports. OTP = On-Time Performance; PRIIA = the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act (P.L. 110-432, Division B).
The 110th Congress attempted to address on-time performance in Section 207 of PRIIA. This
section directed FRA, Amtrak, and the Surface Transportation Board (STB), which regulates
competition in the rail industry, to develop minimum performance standards, incorporate those
standards into rail service contracts, and resolve disputes arising from these standards in
arbitration. Another section in PRIIA, Section 213, gave STB enforcement power over railroads
17 “Amtrak, Norfolk Southern spar over Twitter comments,”
Trains, March 18, 2019, http://trn.trains.com/news/news-
wire/2019/03/18-amtrak-norfolk-southern-spar-over-twitter-comments.
Congressional Research Service
7
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
that failed to meet their performance standards. Final metrics and standards went into effect in
2010.18
The Association of American Railroads, an industry group representing freight rail companies,
sued to block the metrics and standards in 2011, asserting that Congress improperly gave Amtrak,
defined in statute as a private entity, the power to regulate other private entities and that
exercising such power deprived host railroads of their right to due process. A series of federal
court decisions culminated in a unanimous Supreme Court ruling that Amtrak could be
considered part of the government for the purposes of deciding the case.19 The 2010 standards
were suspended during much of the legal proceedings, and Amtrak on-time performance has
decreased since reaching a systemwide high of roughly 80% in 2012.
On July 20, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
without an arbitrator to enforce the standards, Amtrak is not exercising undue coercive power
over its competitors.20 The Supreme Court declined AAR’s appeal of this decision on June 3,
2019, allowing the federal government’s power to set performance standards to remain in place.
The 2010 standards remained vacated, but FRA was free to establish new standards with
Amtrak’s input. The new final rule was published in the
Federal Register in December 2020, and
evaluates performance using a new metric, customer on-time performance.21 This measures the
number of passengers who arrived within 15 minutes of the scheduled time, in contrast to
Amtrak’s past practice of measuring the percentage of trains that arrived at endpoints or at
intermediate stations on or close to schedule.
In their comments on the proposed rule, host railroads objected to the new standards, claiming
that current schedules do not take customer on-time performance into account and should be
renegotiated first. The final rule did incorporate a grace period for host railroads to renegotiate
schedules with Amtrak before the new standards can be enforced. It is not clear to what extent, if
any, the current schedules are any less realistic under a customer on-time performance standard
than under endpoint or all stations OTP standards such as were promulgated in 2010.22
Recent Improvements to the Existing Network
Most recent attempts to improve intercity passenger rail have involved making improvements to
infrastructure and equipment on existing routes, rather than the planning and implementation of
new routes. However, the geography of existing lines can constrain efforts to increase speeds, and
the freight railroads that control most of the lines Amtrak uses have little incentive to allow higher
speeds or more frequent passenger service without concessions in return, such as capital
improvements that also serve to improve freight flows. This section describes federally funded
programs to improve Amtrak’s route network in order to extend the life of existing infrastructure,
improve reliability, increase service frequency, and/or reduce scheduled trip times.
18 75
Federal Register 26839.
19
Department of Transportation, et al., v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
20
Association of American Railroads v. DOT, No. 17-5123 (DC Cir. 2018).
21 85
Federal Register 72971.
22 At that time, host railroads’ chief objection concerned Amtrak’s relative position within the industry, not the viability
of its schedules.
Congressional Research Service
8
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
The Northeast Corridor
The Northeast Corridor (NEC), already the busiest intercity passenger rail line in the nation at the
time of PRIIA’s enactment, received nearly $1 billion in HSIPR funds divided among several
projects. Some of these projects resulted in the construction of infrastructure intended to improve
train service or prevent its deterioration, while others completed prerequisite environmental and
engineering studies for large projects that remain unfunded.
Table 1. Status of Major HSIPR-Funded Projects on the NEC
Project
HSIPR Funding
Expected Outcomes
Status
Trenton-New Brunswick
$450 mil ion (ARRA)
Upgraded tracks and
Construction complete;
Improvements
electrical systems to allow no change to timetables
top speeds of 160 mph
for 23 miles in New
Jersey
Harold Interlocking
$295 mil ion (ARRA)
Upgraded tracks to
Construction complete;
reduce congestion for
no change to timetables
trains between New York (mainly benefits
City and New England
commuter rail)
Baltimore & Potomac
$60 mil ion (ARRA)
Preliminary engineering
Funding required for final
Tunnel
and environmental review
design and construction
to replace 150-year-old
(est. cost: $4.5 bil ion)
two-track tunnel with
higher-speed four-track
tunnel
Portal North Bridge
$39 mil ion (ARRA)
Final design to replace
Construction funded; ful
110-year-old movable
construction expected to
bridge with higher-speed
last five years
fixed bridge near Newark, (est. cost: $1.9 bil ion)
NJ
Susquehanna River Bridge
$22 mil ion (ARRA)
Preliminary engineering
Funding required for final
and environmental review
design and construction
to replace 110-year-old
(est. cost: $0.9 bil ion)
movable bridge with two
higher-speed fixed bridges
Delaware Third Track
$13 mil ion (FY2010)
Triple-tracking a 1.5-mile
Construction complete;
two-track chokepoint to
no change to timetables
increase capacity through
Wilmington, DE
Source: FRA,
Amtrak.
NEC Future
Apart from funding specific infrastructure projects, PRIIA also called for a corridor improvement
plan for the NEC. The planning project, NEC Future, has identified goals for rail service along
the corridor and recommended specific infrastructure investments necessary to bring about the
desired level of service. A corridor-level Environmental Impact Statement evaluated several
alternatives, from maintaining the corridor at what are essentially current service levels to
building a brand new corridor adjacent to the existing one capable of much faster trips but at a
considerably higher capital cost. The Selected Alternative, approved in a Record of Decision
Congressional Research Service
9
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
(ROD) issued in July 2017, fell in between these two options, improving speed and capacity on
existing infrastructure without building an entirely new parallel route.
One limitation of the existing Northeast Corridor is the path taken by trains along the coast of
Long Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut. The tight curves along the shore reduce speeds
and lengthen trip times. NEC Future planners initially recommended the construction of new
tracks set farther inland along a straighter path, but this was met with opposition from local
groups that objected to the construction of new rail lines in their towns. The Selected Alternative
considered in the Final Environmental Impact Statement recommended further study of this
segment of the corridor.23
The Gateway Program
Amtrak says that no further significant expansion of intercity service on the NEC is possible
without increasing capacity into and through Manhattan. Also, the reliability of that service is
threatened due to the aftereffects of the flooding of the rail tunnel under the Hudson River during
Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The Gateway Program is a package of projects proposed to increase
both reliability and capacity. The centerpiece is a new two-track tunnel under the Hudson River,
supplementing the current tunnel, and conceived in the aftermath of the 2010 cancellation by the
State of New Jersey of a similar tunnel project called Access to the Region’s Core (ARC). The
cost estimates for the entire program of work are in the range of $24 billion to $29 billion.
One challenge facing the Gateway Program is that Amtrak, the infrastructure owner, and New
Jersey Transit, the other primary beneficiary of the improvements, have limited ability to fund the
improvements. New Jersey Transit does not earn a profit and needs several billion dollars for
other projects. Amtrak earned an operating profit of $568 million on its NEC operations in
FY2019,24 but revenues have been severely reduced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
at least a portion of Amtrak’s NEC operating profit is pledged starting in 2022 to repay a $2.45
billion federal loan Amtrak received in 2016 to purchase new train cars.25 Amtrak also has several
billion dollars in other needs, including a backlog of projects to restore its infrastructure to a state
of good repair.
A second challenge facing the program is that while assistance may be sought from the federal
government, current federal transportation grant programs are not structured to provide large
amounts of funding to a particular project on a predictable basis over many years. Funding under
discretionary programs depends on the amount that Congress appropriates each year. Since the
Gateway Program would improve both intercity passenger rail service and commuter rail service,
the individual projects that are part of the program could be eligible for assistance from federal
programs that focus on either intercity passenger rail or public transit, but no program of either
type currently provides multi-year funding of the magnitude sought by Gateway project sponsors.
The two projects within the Gateway program that are farthest along in their planning and design
phases—the Portal North Bridge and Hudson Tunnel Projects—are in project development for
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Capital Investment Grant (CIG) funding, but FTA has at
times cast doubt on the strength of their local financial commitments. Sponsors of both projects
23 Ana Radelat, “Feds drop Old Saybrook-to-Rhode Island bypass from final rail plan,”
CT Mirror, July 12, 2017,
https://ctmirror.org/2017/07/12/feds-drop-old-saybrook-to-rhode-island-bypass-from-final-rail-plan/.
24 Amtrak,
September FY2019 (Year-End) Monthly Performance Report (preliminary and unaudited), “Route Level
Results,” p. 7, available at https://www.amtrak.com/about-amtrak/reports-documents.html.
25 Amtrak,
Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended September 30, 2017 and 2016, p. 25, available at
https://www.amtrak.com/about-amtrak/reports-documents.html.
Congressional Research Service
10
link to page 16
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
have planned to use federal RRIF and TIFIA loans—to be repaid with local funds—as part of the
nonfederal share of project costs, but FTA has not accepted this approach.26 U.S. DOT ultimately
signed a full-funding grant agreement for the Portal North Bridge project in January 2021,
allowing construction to commence.27
The National Network
Most federal grant funding to improve the existing passenger rail system has gone to routes on
Amtrak’s National Network, outside the Northeast Corridor. These routes do not routinely
generate the operating surpluses found on the NEC and are generally operated over tracks owned
by private freight railroads, so the HSIPR program involved spending public funds to improve
privately owned rail infrastructure, or else to facilitate the purchase of that infrastructure by a
public agency.
One criticism of the HSIPR program has been that investments were spread out so thinly that they
could fund only limited service improvements. Building a true high-speed rail line under HSIPR
would have required FRA to concentrate considerable funding on a single project, something
Congress did not direct FRA to do. Developing true high-speed passenger rail services with
federal assistance will be challenging given the inevitable pressures to distribute federal funding
widely.
State-Supported Routes
Half of all Amtrak trips are taken on state-supported routes, and state-supported routes have
accounted for a large portion of the growth in Amtrak’s ridership over the last two decades. To
build on this growth, several states received infusions of federal funding to increase speeds, add
additional frequencies, extend service to new stations, or generally improve reliability by
replacing aging infrastructure.
Table 2 below contains a list of selected improvements to state-supported routes to receive
HSIPR grants. Some of these projects are already complete and have been successful; others,
especially the larger and more complex corridor improvement projects, have encountered delays
and have not yet delivered their intended benefits. Status updates for three of these projects
appear beneath the table.
26 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Examining the Administration’s
Infrastructure Proposal, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 2018, 115-37 (Washington: GPO, 2018), pp. 44-45.
27 NJ Transit, “Murphy administration celebrates final step toward construction of new Portal North Bridge,” press
release, January 14, 2021, https://www.njtransit.com/press-releases/murphy-administration-celebrates-final-step-
toward-construction-new-portal-north.
Congressional Research Service
11
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Table 2. Selected HSIPR-Funded Improvements to State-Supported Routes
HSIPR
Corridor
Funding
Major Performance Goals
Current Status
Chicago-St. Louis
$1.3 bil ion
Reduce trip time to 4h45m (a 55-
110 mph service initiated in part,
minute reduction) by increasing
but trip times range from 5h20m
maximum speed to 110mph.
to 5hr57m. Construction under
way on Springfield segment. Plans
for ful double-tracking canceled.
Chicago-Detroit
$0.6 bil ion
Reduce Kalamazoo-Dearborn
110mph service initiated in part;
segment travel time 30 minutes
Kalamazoo-Dearborn trip time
by increasing maximum speed to
reduced approximately 15
110mph.
minutes; Chicago-Kalamazoo trip
time reduced approximately 12
minutes. Plans for added round
trips canceled.
Portland-Seattle
$0.8 bil ion
Add two new round trips per
New schedule and added service
day, and reduce trip time by 10
on hold fol owing a derailment on
minutes by rerouting trains to
the first day of service over new
new tracks through Tacoma.
route through Tacoma in 2017.
Raleigh-Charlotte
$0.7 bil ion
Add two round trips per day.
Complete.
New Haven-Springfield
$0.2 bil ion
Improve track and stations to
Complete.
accommodate additional intercity
and commuter traffic.
Springfield-St. Albans
$0.1 bil ion
Reduce trip time by 25 minutes
Complete.
by rerouting trains in
Massachusetts and increasing
speeds to 79mph in Vermont.
Boston-Brunswick
<$0.1 bil ion
Extend service 30 miles from
Complete.
existing terminus in Portland to
Freeport and Brunswick, ME.
Source: Compiled by CRS from FRA, IDOT, MDOT, NCDOT, ConnDOT, VTrans, NNEPRA, Amtrak.
Notes: Some projects may have received additional federal funds in the form of TIGER, BUILD, or other grants.
HSIPR funding may include a combination of corridor improvement grants and individual project grants (for
example, station renovations).
Chicago-St. Louis
The Chicago-St. Louis corridor improvement program, though it was dubbed Illinois HSR, did
not have as its immediate objective the implementation of true high-speed rail along the corridor.
Rather, a series of targeted investments was planned to create additional rail capacity, reducing
interference from freight trains and allowing passenger trains to reach speeds of 110 mph. In
2012, 110-mph service was initiated on the 15-mile segment between Dwight and Pontiac, IL, but
not on the remaining segments from Dwight to Joliet and Pontiac to Alton. Portions of the
route—from Chicago to Joliet, from St. Louis to Alton, and passing through Springfield—are
congested with freight and/or commuter traffic and impose lower speed limits, further hampering
efforts to reduce trip time.
A federally funded environmental study identified alternatives for double-tracking the entire
corridor, including the segments not improved by the HSIPR corridor development grant. These
alternatives would double existing service levels to eight round trips daily, and have the potential
Congressional Research Service
12
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
to reduce end-to-end travel times by nearly two hours. The corridor-level study estimated the
costs of implementing these alternatives at between $4.9 billion and $5.2 billion, including
building new tracks in the congested areas in Springfield and just outside Chicago and St. Louis.28
A project in Springfield that would reroute passenger and freight trains onto separate tracks is
under construction with the support of TIGER grants, but the environmental reviews for the
Chicago-Joliet and Granite City-St. Louis segments were suspended in November 2018. FRA
indicated that the project sponsors did not want to pursue the environmental reviews at that
time.29
Chicago-Detroit
Freight railroad Norfolk Southern no longer wished to maintain a 135-mile section of the corridor
from Kalamazoo, MI, to Dearborn, MI, to the standards necessary to run passenger trains at 79
mph, meaning speeds would have decreased and trip times would have increased without outside
intervention. The State of Michigan used HSIPR grant funds to purchase the section from Norfolk
Southern, bringing it into public ownership and making improvements that would allow top
speeds of 110 mph. In 2012, 110-mph service was initiated on a separate 97-mile segment from
Porter, IN, to Kalamazoo, the result of upgrades paid for with ARRA funds awarded directly to
Amtrak, which owns that segment. As of 2019, the cumulative effect of these improvements has
been to reduce average trip times between Chicago and Detroit by approximately 25 minutes.30
Further reductions may be possible as additional segments are upgraded to 110 mph.
A federally funded environmental study for the corridor resulted in a Draft Environmental Impact
Statement that identified alternatives for further improvements on the route, increasing service to
six or 10 daily round trips (from the existing three) and making further reductions to trip time.
Key among these improvements would be the selection of a new route from Chicago to Michigan
City, IN. On November 30, 2018, FRA announced it was rescinding the Notice of Intent issued as
part of this environmental review, effectively halting the planning process before reaching the
Final EIS or Record of Decision stage. However, FRA also noted that planning work completed
to that point could be reused in future projects, given sufficient interest and funding.31
Portland-Seattle
On December 18, 2017, a southbound Amtrak
Cascades train derailed near DuPont, WA, killing
three and injuring 62. The train was the first in regular service to use the Point Defiance Bypass,
an inland rail route upgraded using some of Washington State’s HSIPR funds. The Bypass was to
reduce travel times between Seattle and Portland by 10 minutes without raising the maximum
allowable speed on the track. In the aftermath of the derailment, Amtrak has been operating trains
on its original route and schedule.
On May 21, 2019, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) published an abstract of its
final report and recommendations following an investigation of the 2017 derailment.32 NTSB
recommended that Amtrak no longer operate the route with a certain type of passenger car.
Amtrak and the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) complied, retiring
28 Illinois Department of Transportation and Federal Railroad Administration,
Chicago to St. Louis High-Speed Rail
Tier 1 Final Environmental Impact Statement: Volume I – Section 3 – Alternatives, October 2012, p. 3-62 (table 3.4-2).
29 83
Federal Register 61710.
30 Amtrak timetables effective May 2, 2012, and July 16, 2018.
31 83 Federal Register 61710.
32 National Transportation Safety Board, “Inadequate Planning, Insufficient Training Led to Fatal Amtrak Train
Derailment,” May 21, 2019, https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/mr-20190521.aspx.
Congressional Research Service
13
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
those cars in June 2020, reducing the fleet of usable cars at a time when fewer cars were
necessary due to pandemic-related reductions in service.
Expanded Service in Virginia
Though not a major recipient of HSIPR funds, Virginia has been among the more active states in
supporting new and expanded intercity passenger rail service. Since Amtrak’s inception, a few
trains per day operating on the NEC have continued on to serve destinations in Virginia, such as
Richmond and Newport News, on tracks owned by freight railroads. With additional state
support,
Northeast Regional trains began serving Lynchburg in 2009, Norfolk in 2012, and
Roanoke in 2017. The state also collaborated with neighboring North Carolina on plans to
connect destinations in that state to Washington, DC, using a stretch of abandoned track between
Richmond and Raleigh.
In 2019, Virginia Governor Ralph Northam announced that the commonwealth had agreed to
purchase half of the Washington-Richmond corridor and several hundred miles of rail right-of-
way elsewhere for $3.7 billion, with the goal of expanding service and improving trip times.33
The plan calls for a doubling of Washington-Richmond service, additional trains to Newport
News and Norfolk, extending Roanoke service to Christiansburg near the Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and restoration of the Richmond-Raleigh line to accommodate traffic to and from points
farther south. Central to the plan is the construction of a new bridge across the Potomac River
between Virginia and the District of Columbia, expanding the total number of usable tracks from
two to four to alleviate a bottleneck affecting freight and passenger trains. The first new trains
were anticipated in 2020, but service reductions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have
delayed their introduction indefinitely.
New State-Supported Service: Chicago-Quad Cities-Iowa City
The States of Il inois and Iowa were selected to receive HSIPR grants that would have made possible the initiation
of a new state-supported Amtrak route linking Chicago to Iowa City, via the Quad Cities (Moline and Rock Island,
IL, and Davenport and Bettendorf, IA). The two states jointly received $230 mil ion in federal funds in 2011, but
implementation has been slowed by reluctance on the part of state governments to commit the nonfederal
matching funds required by the grant agreements.
The original grant was split between the two states, with Il inois receiving $177 mil ion and Iowa receiving $53
mil ion. Each state put its share of the project on hold fol owing the inauguration of new governors, each of whom
had concerns about potential cost overruns and the need to provide operating subsidies. Iowa completed
preliminary engineering but did not provide matching funds to begin construction, while Il inois put its share of the
project—already under construction in some places—on hold indefinitely. The Il inois state legislature recently
voted to appropriate $225 mil ion in state funds to complete improvements necessary to extend service to
Moline, indicating that the Il inois portion of the project is poised to resume construction. The expiration date for
Il inois’ $177 mil ion HSIPR grant has been extended to the end of 2024 to give the state additional flexibility, but
no anticipated start date for the service has been disclosed.
Long-Distance Routes
Some efforts to put Amtrak on more stable financial footing have centered on reforming the long-
distance routes that Amtrak operates as part of the National Network. These routes require the
largest operating subsidies, have the lowest on-time performance of Amtrak’s three business
lines, and make many stops at small communities that are not major generators of passenger
traffic. At the same time, those communities may see Amtrak service as an important link to other
33 Commonwealth of Virginia, “Virginia and CSX Announce Landmark Rail Agreement,” press release, December 19,
2019, https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2019/december/headline-850120-en.html.
Congressional Research Service
14
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
cities or as a point of local pride. This has led to the federal government pursuing policies,
sometimes simultaneously, that preserve existing long-distance train service while pushing
Amtrak to reduce or eliminate operating losses.
Grants to Improve or Retain Existing Long-Distance Routes
Congress has supported long-distance routes primarily through annual appropriations to the
National Network, which help cover operating subsidies and some capital projects necessary to
maintain service. The FAST Act authorized gradual increases in grants to the National Network,
from $1 billion in FY2016 to $1.2 billion in FY2020. Appropriators have generally met or
exceeded these authorized levels.
For FY2019, appropriations to the National Network included $50 million to support capital
grants necessary to maintain long-distance service over tracks where “Amtrak is the sole operator
on a host railroad’s line and a positive train control system is not required by law or regulation.”34
These funds were allowed by statute to be used as nonfederal matching funds for competitive
discretionary grants that would lead to such projects.
This measure was instrumental in sustaining operations of the
Southwest Chief route that runs
from Chicago to Los Angeles. A segment of the route, between La Junta, CO, and Lamy, NM,
receives no freight service; track owner BNSF Railway did not wish to pay to maintain the tracks
for Amtrak’s exclusive benefit, instead offering to reroute the train on different tracks between
Kansas and New Mexico. Local communities along the route applied for and received federal
TIGER grants, which required $3 million in matching funds from Amtrak. In 2018, Amtrak
signaled it would not contribute these matching funds and would instead consider replacing trains
with buses in certain areas. However, the $50 million set-aside from FY2019 appropriations
funded the remaining share of project costs, allowing the project to proceed and train service to
continue along the entirety of the route.
Proposals to Convert Long-Distance Routes to State-Supported Corridors
In the past, U.S. DOT as well as Amtrak itself have proposed changes to long-distance train
service. These changes closely parallel Amtrak’s plan, ultimately suspended, to replace a section
of the
Southwest Chief with bus service. In its FY2020 budget request, the Trump Administration
proposed eliminating operating support for long-distance trains and a corresponding reduction in
National Network grants, but an increase in funding to the Restoration and Enhancements grant
program to help states temporarily bridge the funding gap.35 In its own FY2020 grant request,
Amtrak showed some willingness to alter how long-distance routes are funded and operated,
stating that “a modernization of the National Network, with the right level of dedicated and
enhanced federal funding, would allow Amtrak to serve more passengers efficiently while
preserving our ability to maintain
appropriate Long Distance routes” (emphasis added). 36 More
recent Amtrak outreach has focused on expanding the number of state-supported short-distance
corridors without specific regard to corresponding changes to long-distance routes.
34 P.L. 116-6, Div. G.
35 https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/budget/334311/fra-fy-2020-budget-estimates-508-
compliant.pdf.
36 https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/english/public/documents/corporate/reports/Amtrak-General-
Legislative-Annual-Report-FY2020-Grant-Request.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
15
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act contained a Sense of Congress that “long-distance
passenger rail routes provide much-needed transportation access for 4,700,000 riders in 325
communities in 40 states and are particularly important in rural areas; and long-distance
passenger rail routes and services should be sustained to ensure connectivity throughout the
National network.”37 While there were 4.7 million trips on long-distance routes in 2017, and 4.5
million in 2018 and 2019, many stations that receive only long-distance train service have very
few daily boardings and alightings. Service on all long-distance trains was reduced to three trains
per week during the COVID-19 pandemic, with no known timetable for a return to daily service.
Long-Distance Competitive Pilot Program
One way Congress has attempted to control or reduce operating subsidies for passenger rail is to
open the network to a greater degree of competition. This has proven to be difficult given
Amtrak’s advantages over other operators, including a statutory requirement that freight railroads
grant Amtrak trains preference in using their tracks, and another that Amtrak be charged only the
incremental cost of using another railroad’s tracks.38
Section 214 of PRIIA required FRA to implement a program that would allow other operators to
submit competing bids to take over certain routes operated by Amtrak.39 This program would be
open to any of the railroad companies that serve as hosts to Amtrak long-distance routes, with
Amtrak able to respond to any outside bid with one of its own. FRA would then select a winning
bidder, which would be entitled to receive an annual operating subsidy of no more than the prior
fiscal year’s subsidy amount, adjusted for inflation. Up to two routes could be operated in this
manner for up to five years, selected from among the worst-performing routes according to a
classification system contained elsewhere within PRIIA. FRA promulgated its final rule
establishing this program in 2011,40 but no bids were submitted.
The program was revisited in the FAST Act,41 which increased the number of available routes
from two to three, reduced the operation period from five years to four with the possibility of
reapplication for a second four-year term, and capped operating subsidies at 10% below the level
in the prior fiscal year. The list of eligible bidders was also expanded to include not just host
railroads, but also one or more states and partnerships between a state and a host railroad. FRA
promulgated its final rule reestablishing this program in 2017,42 but again no bids have been
submitted.
37 P.L. 116-260, Div. L, §155.
38 See CRS Report R42512,
Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli.
39 P.L. 110-432, §214.
40 76
Federal Register 77716, December 14, 2011.
41 P.L. 114-94, §11307.
42 82
Federal Register 31476, July 7, 2017.
Congressional Research Service
16
link to page 29
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
PRIIA §217: Competition on State-Supported Routes
Section 217 of PRIIA allows states to enter into agreements with entities other than Amtrak to operate their state-
supported routes. In 2015, Indiana became the first—and so far only—state to employ this provision when it
contracted with a private railroad company to provide equipment for the Chicago-Indianapolis
Hoosier State route.
At the time, the Chicago-Indianapolis corridor was served by one train in each direction per day. Three days a week,
this service was provided by the
Cardinal long-distance route, which also served Cincinnati, Washington, DC, and New
York City. The other four days, the corridor was served by the
Hoosier State on a comparable schedule. The cost
allocation provisions in PRIIA required the State of Indiana to support the shorter route if it were to be continued.
After nearly discontinuing service in 2013, Indiana reached an agreement to share the $3 mil ion annual cost between
state and local governments, making it the last route to have its PRIIA-required state support agreement in place.43
In 2015, the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) selected railroad company Iowa Pacific Holdings to
provide and service the equipment, with Amtrak providing crew and handling ticketing. Iowa Pacific was able to offer
on-board Wi-Fi and a dining car, neither of which was offered when Amtrak provided the equipment. On-time
performance improved in 2016 before falling again in 2017, but ridership did not increase. Less than two years into the
contract, Iowa Pacific announced it could no longer fulfil the terms of the agreement without additional subsidies,
which Indiana did not provide.44 Subsequently, Amtrak provided and maintained the equipment as it had done prior to
PRIIA. Indiana adopted a two-year budget in April 2019 that did not include continuing subsidies for the
Hoosier State.
Thrice-weekly
Cardinal service, funded as part of Amtrak’s National Network, wil continue.45
High-Speed Rail and Other New Lines
Projects to retain or improve existing Amtrak services, as described in the previous section,
routinely require investments amounting to tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. High-speed
rail systems of the type in use in Europe and Asia, which can make only limited use of
infrastructure designed for conventional rail, require significant investments in new infrastructure.
Even when built for conventional rail equipment compatible with existing lines, establishing new
rail service is a capital-intensive, time-consuming process. For example, a federally funded study
of rail options in New York State estimated that instituting 125-mph service from New York City
to Albany and Buffalo would require $14.7 billion in capital funding.46
A list of active or recently completed corridor plans and their cost estimate ranges can be found in
Appendix B.
California High-Speed Rail
The California High-Speed Rail (CAHSR) program is a project led by the State of California with
the goal of implementing a true high-speed rail system, capable of speeds in excess of 200 mph,
between Los Angeles and San Francisco via the Central Valley cities of Fresno and Bakersfield.
Ground was broken on the Central Valley section on January 6, 2015. Since that time, the
California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) has completed civil works such as construction
43 Howey Politics Indiana, “Governor: Pence Announces Agreement with Amtrak,” HPI Daily Wire, October 16, 2013,
https://howeypolitics.com/PrintArticle.aspx?aid=10465&uid=7101a217-4f4f-454d-a64d-fffbfdaa6989.
44 “Iowa Pacific withdraws from Hoosier State Train service,”
Progressive Railroading, January 31, 2017,
https://www.progressiverailroading.com/amtrak/article/Iowa-Pacific-withdraws-from-Hoosier-State-Train-service—
50723.
45 Mary Wisniewski, “Hoosier State Amtrak train from Chicago to Indianapolis to end July 1 because Indiana won’t
fund it,”
Chicago Tribune, April 30, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-biz-amtrak-hoosier-train-
cut-20190430-story.html.
46 New York State Department of Transportation and Federal Railroad Administration,
High Speed Rail Empire
Corridor Tier 1 Draft Environmental Impact Statement Volume 1, January 2014, pp. 6-13 (exh. 6-9).
Congressional Research Service
17
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
of viaducts or grade separations along the route. Construction of the full “Phase 1” system
connecting San Francisco to Los Angeles, originally anticipated to be completed in 2028, is now
expected to take until 2033.47
Funding for CAHSR has never been committed in sufficient quantities to cover the entire
projected cost of construction. In 2008, California voters approved ballot measure Proposition
1A, which authorized the state to issue $9 billion in bonds. At the time Proposition 1A was
approved, California assumed a level of federal and private sector support that ultimately never
materialized. The project did receive a total of $3.9 billion in federal HSIPR grants, some from
ARRA and some from FY2010 appropriations. While estimates for the cost of the project have
fluctuated, the 2018 business plan estimates the capital cost of the Central Valley segment alone
at $10.6 billion, and the Phase 1 system at $77.3 billion.
In February 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom announced in his State of the State
Address that there “simply isn’t a path” to complete the full system without additional funding.48
He later clarified that his comments were not intended to convey that the project was canceled;
the section under construction is expected to result in improved passenger rail service in the
central valley, and may still result in improved connections to San Francisco once other
infrastructure projects are complete.49 The federal government has taken steps to reclaim federal
grant money awarded to the project, on the grounds that the scope of the project has changed too
much to be an eligible recipient of federal funding under the terms of the grant agreement.50
California is challenging these efforts in court; of the two largest grants CHSRA received, a $2.6
billion grant has already been fully spent in accordance with a federal deadline, while a second
$929 million grant that has no such deadline remains untouched.
All Aboard Florida/Brightline/XpressWest
After the State of Florida turned down a federal HSIPR grant and canceled its Tampa-Orlando rail
project, the private company All Aboard Florida (AAF) began making plans to initiate a new
intercity passenger rail line between Miami and Orlando via West Palm Beach. That service, now
called
Brightline, does not use the same tracks used by Amtrak. Instead,
Brightline operates
between Miami and West Palm Beach using tracks owned by a regional freight railroad, Florida
East Coast Industries (FECI; AAF and FECI were at the time both owned by asset management
firm Fortress Investment Group), and is building new track that would allow operation between
West Palm Beach and Orlando. The diesel-powered trains are expected to provide a three-hour
trip between Miami and Orlando, more than two hours faster than Amtrak’s services between
those two cities.
All Aboard Florida initially sought a $1.6 billion federal RRIF loan to finance construction of the
portion of the route between West Palm Beach and Orlando, but no loan was authorized. Instead,
AAF applied to U.S. DOT for allocations to sell $600 million of qualified private activity bonds
47 California High-Speed Rail Authority,
2018 Business Plan, June 2018, p. 33.
48 Sophia Bollag, “‘Let’s be real.’ Gavin Newsom says he’ll cut back on California’s high-speed rail plan,”
The
Sacramento Bee, February 12, 2019, at https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/
article226151030.html.
49 CHSRA Project Update Report to the California State Legislature, March 2019. California has developed additional
projects to improve these connections, such as extending the BART rail transit network to San Jose.
50 “Statement of Federal Railroad Administration on Termination of FY ’10 Grant Agreement with California High-
Speed Rail Authority,” at https://railroads.dot.gov/newsroom/statement-federal-railroad-administration-termination-fy-
%E2%80%9810-grant-agreement-california.
Congressional Research Service
18
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
to finance work on the Miami-West Palm Beach segment and another $2.25 billion for the West
Palm Beach-Orlando segment.51 The interest on these bonds is exempt from federal income tax;
hence, the federal government is subsidizing the project by allowing it to borrow money at a
lower interest rate than it would have to pay without the federal tax exemption.52
Brightline rail
service between Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach began on January 13, 2018, with service
expanding to Miami by May 19 of that year.
Brightline suspended service in 2020 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, but expects to begin operating trains to Orlando in 2022. Two additional
stations along its South Florida route are under construction, paid for by local governments.
Brightline has announced plans to extend its service from downtown Miami to the city’s cruise
ship terminals and from Orlando to Disney World and Tampa.53
In 2018, All Aboard Florida acquired XpressWest, a private company planning to build and
operate a passenger rail service between Las Vegas, NV, and the Los Angeles area. XpressWest
had been in the early stages of applying for a RRIF loan that was ultimately not issued. The
project was subsequently rebranded
Brightline West. In January 2021, the project’s sponsor stated
that it had contracted with Siemens Mobility for trainsets54 and that it had reached design and
construction agreements with the California and Nevada departments of transportation to build in
the Interstate 15 corridor between Las Vegas and Apple Valley, CA. It said it planned to begin
construction early in the second quarter of 2021.55
Texas Central Railway
A private company, Texas Central Partners, is moving forward with plans to construct a true high-
speed rail line between the cities of Dallas and Houston. The project, which has the backing of a
Japanese rail operator and would use Japanese high-speed rail technology and equipment, would
reach top speeds of 186 mph and take 90 minutes end-to-end. There is currently no direct rail
service of any kind linking Dallas and Houston. Although the sponsors have stated, “This project
is not backed by public funds,”56 news reports have indicated that the project is likely to depend
on long-term loans from the federal government’s RRIF and TIFIA programs.57
The project is not yet under construction. It passed two milestones in 2020, completing its
Environmental Impact Statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
receiving a “rule of particular applicability” (RPA) from FRA that will allow use of technology
and equipment built to Japanese specifications, which would otherwise not comply with FRA
safety and operating rules. One persistent obstacle has been the acquisition of land on which to
build the new tracks. There have been conflicting county-level court rulings on whether Texas
51 Virgin Trains USA LLC, Form S-1 Registration Statement, November 16, 2018, p. F-39; Brightline, “Virgin Trains
USA Closes $1.75 Billion Private Activity Bond Sale to Fund Phase 2 Expansion to Orlando,” press release, April 19,
2019; Shelly Sigo, “$950 million in bonds for Florida’s Virgin Trains USA price Thursday,”
Bond Buyer, June 12,
2019.
52 CRS Report RL31457,
Private Activity Bonds: An Introduction, by Steven Maguire and Joseph S. Hughes.
53 https://www.gobrightline.com/florida-expansion, viewed February 2, 2021.
54 These would require FRA to waive certain regulations; see https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2021-
02365/petition-for-waiver-of-compliance.
55 Letter, Sarah Watterson, president, DesertXpress Enterprises LLC., to Nevada High-Speed Rail Authority, January 4,
2021, at https://nvhsra.rtcsnv.com/.
56 Texas Central, Learn the Facts, http://www.texascentral.com/facts/, viewed October 14, 2016.
57 Eric Nicholson, “Texas Central Railway’s Fuzzy Definition of ‘Privately Financed,’”
Dallas Observer, August 11,
2015, http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-central-railways-fuzzy-definition-of-privately-financed-7479867.
Congressional Research Service
19
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Central can take the land it needs using eminent domain. Despite these legal issues, the company
has stated it could begin construction on the line in 2021 and be fully operational in 2026.58
Issues for Congress
Corridor Plans Outstrip Historical Funding Availability
Many HSIPR grants funded studies of new or improved passenger rail corridors. A few of these
studies were ultimately canceled before reaching completion, but others have resulted in near-
finished plans to enhance intercity passenger rail. These plans often feature capital cost
projections in the billions of dollars, even for projects with comparatively conservative speed and
frequency objectives.
The federal government’s current approach to funding passenger rail differs from its approach to
funding highways and transit. Although PRIIA and the FAST Act set authorized spending levels
over multi-year periods, Amtrak funding is subject to the annual appropriations process, while
many highway and transit programs are funded automatically out of Highway Trust Fund
balances. Likewise, the HSIPR program lacked predictable funding in part because there was no
dedicated revenue source for the program.
In the context of the federal appropriations process it is difficult to provide significant amounts of
funding on a predictable basis to a grant program that depends on the Treasury general fund, as it
must compete with many other programs for funding each year. This problem is exacerbated by
the limits on overall discretionary spending that were imposed by the Budget Control Act of
2011. Supporters of passenger rail service have long called for a dedicated funding source for rail
projects, and previous administrations have echoed such calls. To date, however, Congress has
not taken such a step.
Rail Plans Are Not Always Coordinated
Rail planning in the United States is not centralized, relying on project sponsors (usually states) to
formulate their own plans. Congress and several presidents have, at times, identified corridors as
investment priorities or set out trip time goals for certain routes, but these have usually not been
backed by any financial commitment or implementation plan. The lack of reliable funding for
passenger rail capital projects and operations is one obstacle to rail planning, as some states may
not wish to invest time and resources into a plan that may not be achievable without additional
federal support.
PRIIA contained a requirement for FRA to develop a National Rail Plan (NRP), which has not
taken the form of a standalone document.59 Instead, FRA has issued guidance for states to follow
when drafting their own rail plans, as well as cost estimation and cost-benefit analysis guidance
for project sponsors to follow when planning new or improved rail lines. FRA has also worked
with groups of states to create regional rail plans, identifying service goals and rough cost
estimates for passenger rail service between major cities. A rail study in the Southwest is
complete, while rail studies in the Midwest and Southeast are nearing completion. These regional
58 Texas Central, “The Top Five Things to Know,” at https://www.texascentral.com/media-center/, accessed February
4, 2021.
59 FRA published a “National Rail Plan Progress Report” in September 2010 describing broad goals and priorities for
the national passenger and freight rail systems, at https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-
transportation-launches-port-infrastructure-development-program.
Congressional Research Service
20
link to page 33
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
rail plans are nonbinding and have no construction funding attached, but have identified notional
corridors and service levels for future evaluation with the input of state and local governments.
Taken together, these regional plans represent a slightly more detailed approach to developing a
long-range rail system plan than either the federally designated corridors or the Obama
Administration’s strategic plan.
A map of the notional route alignments and service levels produced by these multistate planning
projects can be found in
Appendix C.
Legal and Regulatory Hurdles to Competition
The short-lived experiment contracting with an equipment provider for the
Hoosier State and the
failure of the long-distance competitive pilot program to generate any applications show that
efforts to foster competition have not resulted in improvements to intercity passenger rail. Part of
this may be attributed to the de facto monopoly status enjoyed by Amtrak since its private sector
competitors ended their passenger businesses.
Amtrak has statutory privileges that currently would not extend to startup passenger rail operating
companies hoping to compete over existing routes. Under current laws and regulations, a new
entrant to passenger rail not wishing to negotiate with Amtrak or freight railroads for track access
must either have a prior affiliation with an existing freight railroad (as with All Aboard Florida) or
must plan to construct its own tracks (as with Texas Central). Congress could re-impose some
obligation to accommodate passenger service on freight railroads. The freight rail industry would
likely be opposed to such a step.60
Intercity Rail Proposals from the 116th Congress
During his 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden offered a plan to “tap existing federal
grant and loan programs at the U.S. Department of Transportation” to accelerate improvements in
the passenger rail system.61 The plan did not identify which programs or at what funding levels,
but several pieces of legislation introduced in the 116th Congress would seem to fit that
description.
One such bill was H.R. 2, a multiyear reauthorization of surface transportation programs, which
contained the Transforming Rail by Accelerating Investment Nationwide (TRAIN) Act. The bill
would have authorized over $58 billion for passenger rail over five years, of which $18.6 billion
was to be provided through an increase in the annual capital and operating grants authorized for
Amtrak. The bill would have replaced the Intercity Passenger Rail program created by Section
301 of PRIIA with a new Passenger Rail Improvement, Modernization, and Expansion (PRIME)
grant program authorized at $19 billion over five years. The PRIME program would have
permitted FRA to issue letters of intent to fund projects out of funds not yet appropriated,
allowing the government to commit funding for long-term rail projects in a way similar to the
existing mechanism for funding public transportation capital projects. Additional funding would
have been made available through the CRISI and Restoration and Enhancements programs, a new
dedicated program for grade crossing improvements, and additional funding to finance RRIF
loans. The bill passed the House on July 1, 2020; it saw no action in the Senate.
60 See archived CRS Report R42512,
Passenger Train Access to Freight Railroad Track, by John Frittelli.
61 https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/.
Congressional Research Service
21
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Three other bills introduced in the 116th Congress would have funded passenger rail projects
using a combination of existing, modified, or new grant programs; none advanced to the
committee markup stage:
The BRAIN TRAIN Act (S. 4030) would have created a new Intercity Passenger
Rail Service Improvement grant program, authorized at $25 billion over five
years. Like H.R. 2, it would have allowed federal loans to count toward a
project’s nonfederal share if they were repaid by nonfederal sources. The bill
would also have created a statutory definition for “high-performance rail,”
deemphasizing the importance of top speed to passenger rail improvements.
The High Speed Rail Corridor Development Act (H.R. 5805) would have
authorized $32 billion over four years for the High-Speed Rail Corridor
Development program, created by Section 501 of PRIIA.
The American High-Speed Rail Act (H.R. 8926) would have authorized $190
billion over five years for a variety of existing passenger rail programs.
Congressional Research Service
22
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Appendix A. Federally Designated HSR Corridors
Table A-1. Description of Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
Date
Corridor Name
Designated
Extent at Designation
Amended Extent
Midwest Corridor
Oct. 15, 1992*
Chicago – Milwaukee
Added Dec. 11, 1998
(Chicago Hub Network)
Chicago – Detroit
Milwaukee – Minneapolis/St.
Chicago – St. Louis
Paul
Added Jan. 28, 1999
Chicago – Indianapolis –
Cincinnati
Added Oct. 11, 2000
Chicago – Toledo – Cleveland
Indianapolis – Louisvil e
Cleveland – Columbus –
Dayton – Cincinnati
Added Jan. 19, 2001
St. Louis – Kansas City
Florida Corridor
Oct. 16, 1992*
Miami – Orlando – Tampa
California Corridor
Oct. 19, 1992*
San Diego – Los Angeles – San
Clarified Oct. 11, 2000
Joaquin Valley – San Francisco
Any corridor alignments
– Sacramento
between the original four
major cities
Added Jul. 2, 2009
Los Angeles – Las Vegas
Southeast Corridor
Oct. 20, 1992*
Washington – Richmond –
Added Dec. 14, 1995
Charlotte
Richmond – Hampton Roads
(Norfolk/Newport News)
Added Dec. 1, 1998
Charlotte – Greenvil e –
Atlanta – Macon
Raleigh – Columbia – Savannah
– Jacksonvil e
Added Oct. 11, 2000
Macon – Jesup
Pacific Northwest
Oct. 20, 1992*
Eugene – Portland – Seattle –
Corridor
Vancouver, BC
Gulf Coast Corridor
Nov. 18, 1998** New Orleans – Houston
Added Oct. 11, 2000
New Orleans – Biloxi – Mobile Birmingham – Atlanta
New Orleans – Meridian –
Birmingham
Keystone Corridor
Dec. 10, 1998**
Philadelphia – Harrisburg
Added Oct. 11, 2000
Harrisburg – Pittsburgh
Empire State Corridor
Dec. 10, 1998**
New York – Albany – Buffalo
Congressional Research Service
23
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Date
Corridor Name
Designated
Extent at Designation
Amended Extent
Northern New England
Oct. 11, 2000**
Boston – Portland/Auburn, ME
Added Dec. 8, 2004
Boston – Montréal, PQ
Boston – Springfield – Albany
Springfield – New Haven
South Central Corridor
Oct. 11, 2000**
Dallas/Ft. Worth – Austin –
San Antonio
Dallas/Ft. Worth – Oklahoma
City – Tulsa
Dallas/Ft. Worth – Texarkana
– Little Rock
Northeast Corridor
Mar. 14,
Washington – Philadelphia –
(NEC)
2011***
New York City – Boston
Source: Federal Railroad Administration (archived); https://web.archive.org/web/20110721040155/http://
www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/passenger/618.shtml.
Notes: *Designated under ISTEA. **Designated under TEA-21. ***The NEC was not initially designated as a
high-speed rail corridor, since the only statutory benefit of being designated was eligibility to receive funds from
the grade crossings set-aside, and the NEC already featured very few grade crossings and already offered speeds
above the 90 mph target set by ISTEA. To clarify its eligibility to receive funds under new programs, it was
officially designated the eleventh high-speed rail corridor in 2011.
Figure A-1. Map of Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
With existing passenger rail network
Source: Rail routes from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, corridors from Federal Railroad Administration
(archived); https://web.archive.org/web/20110721040155/http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/passenger/618.shtml.
Note: There are no Amtrak routes or federally designated high-speed rail corridors located in Alaska or Hawaii.
Congressional Research Service
24
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Appendix B. New, Improved, and Planned Intercity
Passenger Rail Lines
Table B-1. New, Improved, and Planned Intercity Passenger Rail Lines
Route
Service
Est. Cost
Route
Sector
Type
Type
($ Billions)
Status
San Francisco-Los Angeles
Public
New
HSR
$77.3
Central Valley segment
(California High-Speed Rail)
under construction.
Remaining segments not
funded. Active litigation.
New York-Albany-Buffalo-
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$1.7-$14.7
Tier 1 DEIS issued
Niagara Falls (Empire)
January 2014. Tier 1
Final EIS not yet issued.
Six alternatives under
consideration, with top
speeds of 79-125 mph.
Dallas-Houston (Texas
Private
New
HSR
$12-$15
Tier 2 FEIS issued May
Central)
2020; ROD/Rule of
Particular Applicability
(RPA) issued September
2020. Not yet under
construction. Active
litigation.
Miami-Orlando-Tampa
Private
New
Conventional
$4 (approx.) Miami-West Palm Beach
(All Aboard Florida/
segment complete, but
Brightline)
operations suspended
during pandemic;
Orlando segment under
construction; Tampa
segment in planning (not
counted in est. cost).
Victorvil e, CA-Las Vegas
Private
New
HSR
$8.4
Not yet under
(XpressWest/
Brightline
(approx.)
construction.
West)
Atlanta-Charlotte
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$2.0-$15.4
Tier 1 DEIS issued
September 2019. Tier 1
FEIS/ROD not yet
issued.
Richmond-Raleigh
Public
New
Conventional
$2.1
Tier 2 FEIS/ROD issued
March 2017. Design and
construction partially
funded by $47.5 mil ion
in federal CRISI funds to
rehabilitate a 10-mile
segment of abandoned
track.
Congressional Research Service
25
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Route
Service
Est. Cost
Route
Sector
Type
Type
($ Billions)
Status
Washington-Richmond
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$3.4-$5.5
Tier 2 FEIS issued May
2019; Tier 2 ROD issued
September 2019. Does
not include Long Bridge
project in DC. Design
and construction
partially funded,
including acquisition by
Virginia of half the
corridor, currently
owned by CSX.
Washington-New York-
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$121-$153
Tier 1 FEIS/ROD issued
Boston (NEC)
+HSR
July 2017. Design and
construction not funded.
Rutland-Burlington
Public
New
Conventional
$0.03
Construction under way
using $19 mil ion in
federal TIGER grants;
wil extend current New
York-Rutland
Ethan Allen
Express service beginning
in 2021.
Chicago-St. Louis (Il inois
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$4.9-$5.2
Improvements under
HSR)
construction using
HSIPR funds (not
counted in est. cost),
110 mph service initiated
on some segments.
Springfield segment
under construction.
Planning canceled for
Chicago and St. Louis
segments.
Chicago-Milwaukee
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$0.07-$0.19 Draft EA issued October
(Hiawatha)
2016. Final EA/FONSI
not yet issued.
Twin Cities-Milwaukee-
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$0.05
Tier 1 DEIS canceled,
Chicago (TCMC)
but plans to add a
second round trip along
the route of the
Empire
Builder long-distance
train are partially funded.
Minneapolis-Duluth (NLX)
Public
New
Conventional
$0.5
Tier 2 FONSI issued
February, 2018. Design
and construction not
funded.
Chicago-Iowa City
Public
New
Conventional
$0.2-$0.3
Some construction
complete, but additional
state funds required; IL
has committed funds
necessary to restore
service to Moline.
Congressional Research Service
26
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Route
Service
Est. Cost
Route
Sector
Type
Type
($ Billions)
Status
Portland-Eugene
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$0.9-$4.6
Tier 1 DEIS issued
October 2018. Tier 1
FEIS/ROD not yet
issued.
San Luis Obispo-Salinas
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$1.2
Would result in a new
(Coast Daylight)
Los Angeles-San
Francisco service via the
route of the
Coast
Starlight long-distance
train.
Coachella Valley
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
tbd
Tier 1 DEIS not yet
issued.
Oklahoma City-Dallas/Fort
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
tbd
Tier I FEIS/ROD issued
Worth-San Antonio-South
+New
October 2017. Several
Texas (Texas Oklahoma
alternatives under
Passenger Rail Study)
consideration. Tier 2
studies not funded.
New Orleans-Mobile
Public
New
Conventional
$0.06
$33 mil ion federal CRISI
grant awarded for track
improvements, with
anticipated initiation in
2021; matching funds
secured from states of
MS and LA, but not AL.
Richmond-Norfolk
Public
New
Conventional
$0.1
Service initiated 2012.
Lynchburg-Roanoke
Public
New
Conventional
$0.1
Service initiated 2017.
Richmond-Hampton Roads
Public
Upgraded
Conventional
$1.0
Tier 1 FEIS/ROD issued
2012. Tier 2 study not
funded.
Atlanta-Chattanooga
Public
New
HSR
$8.8
Tier 1 FEIS/ROD issued
September 2017. Design
and construction not
funded.
Source: Cost estimates from environmental review documents available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/
environment.
Notes: Table includes
proposed new/improved passenger rail lines that have received federal grant funding, have
advanced past planning stages, or are being advanced privately. Cost estimates may include multiple alternatives
stil under consideration and have not been adjusted for inflation. For additional information regarding NEPA
process as it pertains to transportation infrastructure projects, see CRS Report R42479,
The Role of the
Environmental Review Process in Federally Funded Highway Projects: Background and Issues for Congress, by Linda
Luther.
Congressional Research Service
27
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Figure B-1. Map of New, Improved, and Planned Intercity Passenger Rail Lines
With existing Amtrak network
Source: Existing Amtrak network from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2019. New and planned routes
based on environmental review documents available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/environment, and may include
multiple alternatives stil under consideration.
Note: There are no Amtrak routes or plans to add or improve intercity passenger rail routes located in Alaska
or Hawaii.
Congressional Research Service
28
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Appendix C. Multistate Regional Rail Planning
Study Networks
Figure C-1. Multistate Regional Rail Planning Study Networks
With existing Amtrak network
Source: Existing Amtrak network from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2019. Corridors under study based
on documents available at https://railroads.dot.gov/rail-network-development/planning/regional-rail-planning.
Notes: Corridor alignments based on sequencing of metropolitan areas served. While certain corridors may
appear to fol ow existing Amtrak routes, no determination has been made as to rail lines’ precise physical
alignments or station locations. Other corridors that were projected to have minimal effect on network
performance and/or where minimal ridership would connect to the rest of the network not shown. Final
Midwest and Southeast studies not yet published; final study networks may differ. There are no Amtrak routes
located in Alaska or Hawaii, and those states are not part of any federally led multistate regional rail planning
study areas.
Author Information
Ben Goldman
Analyst in Transportation Policy
Congressional Research Service
29
Improving Intercity Passenger Rail Service in the United States
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R45783
· VERSION 4 · UPDATED
30